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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The formation and termination of coalition governments is one of the few literatures in
political science with a tight connection between theoretical and empirical analysis. Over
the last decade models of coalition formation have been predominantly using non-cooperative
game theory (e.g. Baron 1993, Diermeier and Merlo 2000, Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo
2003, Diermeier and Stevenson 2000, Lupia and Strom 1995, Merlo 1997). In a recent paper
Lupia and Strom (1995) argued that a similar approach can be used to study the duration
of coalition governments. That is, coalition governments need to be sustained as equilibrium
outcomes over time in the presence of potentially destabilizing changes to the political and
economic environment, so-called "critical events" (Browne et. al. 1984, King et al. 1990,
Warwick 1994).
On the one hand this approach marks a promising shift in the study of cabinet durations.
In particular, the speciﬁcation of explicit models of inter-party bargaining is likely to focus
attention on the role of institutional features of the bargaining environment in determining
cabinet failure. On the other hand, the bargaining approach creates various challenging
methodological problems. First, Diermeier and Stevenson (2000) show that testing the Lupia-
Strom model requires careful speciﬁcations of the stochastic model that preclude the usage
of "oﬀ-the-shelf" event study methods. Second, Merlo (1997) pointed out that changing
expectations about government duration (due to external events such as the release of macro-
economic data) may lead party leaders to delay the formation of a government. Hence,
governments that actually form should be viewed as the result of strategic selection by the
members of the proto-coalition. Third, as Diermeier and Merlo (2000) have shown in a
game-theoretic model, expectations about government duration may also inﬂuence which
government is chosen in the ﬁrst place. Together, these results imply that government type,
formation time, and government duration are all simultaneously determined in equilibrium.
That is, taking the concept of governments-as-equilibria seriously may require a radical
2departure from existing empirical approaches that rely on regression-based reduced form
speciﬁcations.
In this paper we present an alternative approach that involves structural estimation. By
specifying a formal model we can interpret the observed data (type of government, duration
etc.) as equilibrium phenomena. Once the model is fully speciﬁed and its parameters es-
timated we can then change key features of the model (e.g. constitutional characteristics)
and then generate simulated data which can be compared to the original data to quantify
the eﬀect of constitutional changes. Speciﬁcally, we use this method to investigate the role
of bicameralism on government formation and duration.
Bicameralism is one of the most salient constitutional features. It can be found in ap-
proximately one third of all legislatures (Tsebelis and Money 1997). Despite its prominent
historical role in constitutional development (e.g. Finer 1997), bicameralism has rarely been
the focus of research in formal comparative politics. Consequently, its eﬀects on policy
processes and outcomes are not well understood.
Almost all of the existing studies of bicameralism focus on legislative bicameralism (that
is, a constitutional arrangement where the legislative function is distributed among mul-
tiple chambers). Recent examples include Diermeier and Myerson (1999), who show how
bicameralism can aﬀect the internal institutional structure of legislatures, and Tsebelis and
Money (1997), who explore the consequences of inter-chamber committees on legislative
output. Our focus, however, is on governmental bicameralism (that is, a constitutional
arrangement where multiple chambers share the right to appoint and remove members of
the executive). In parliamentary democracies an emphasis on government formation (rather
than the legislative process) is justiﬁed because stable governments are able to virtually
dominate the legislative process leaving the legislative opposition with little inﬂuence over
policy outcomes. In parliamentary systems, governmental bicameralism is present whenever
the governing coalition has to maintain the conﬁdence of both chambers of parliament to
3stay in power. We henceforth refer to this constitutional feature as “dual responsibility.”
In Western Europe, Italy, Belgium (until 1995), and Sweden (until 1970) are the only three
countries with dual responsibility.1
The investigation of dual responsibility, however, is important beyond its immediate prac-
tical application to constitutional debates (e.g., whether dual responsibility leads to shorter
government duration). Rather, it presents an ideal test case to investigate the validity of
some basic beliefs about the logic of government formation. For example, one of the more
common beliefs about government formation is that minimal governments are the "normal"
outcome of government formation and that minority or super-majority governments consti-
tute an "anomaly" that needs to be explained. Of course, it is now well-known that minority
and super-majority governments are quite typical and should not be interpreted as a cri-
sis phenomenon (e.g. Strom 1990). However, this empirical reorientation did not lead to
a corresponding theoretical shift. Existing accounts of minority governments, for example,
focus on speciﬁc explanations why majority governments would not form. In his inﬂuential
work Strom (1990), for example, suggests two such mechanisms: opposition parties may
have other channels of inﬂuencing policy or they may fear to pay an electoral cost of joining
an unpopular government. But this implies that in the absence of such factors (i.e. in the
typical case) we should expect minimal winning governments to form. Calls for institutional
reform in Italy and Belgium were guided by a similar concern. Dual responsibility, it was
believed, encourages super-majority governments. Removing dual responsibility thus would
lead to the "typical" case: minimal winning governments.
By studying dual responsibility in detail we can show that this intuition is incorrect.
The theoretical model shows that formateurs face a fundamental trade-oﬀ between control
(their share of the beneﬁts from holding oﬃce) and durability (the size of the total beneﬁts
1In the case of bicameral parliaments without dual responsibility (like, for example, Germany), the upper
chamber only plays a legislative role, but does not participate either in the appointment or the dismissal of
the executive.
4from holding oﬃce). The key insight is that if all potential governments are expected to be
more stable, formateurs will switch from proposing more inclusive governments (e.g. super-
majority governments) to less inclusive governments (e.g. minority governments). However,
there is no reason that this equilibrium replacement eﬀect will stop at minimal winning
coalitions. Rather, minimal winning governments will form when the incentives between
durability and control are balanced.
The key methodological point of this analysis is that we need to account for the equi-
librium response of strategic party leaders in evaluating issues of constitutional design or
reform. Just because potential governments may last longer does not imply that actual gov-
ernments will be more durable, since government formation is the outcome of a strategic
bargaining and selection process.
There is little existing empirical or theoretical work that has investigated the consequences
of dual responsibility on the composition and the duration of coalition governments. The few
studies that investigated the link between bicameralism and coalition governments have fo-
cused primarily on legislative bicameralism (Druckman and Thies 2002, Lijphart 1984, Sjölin
1993, Tsebelis 2000). The two main theoretical conclusions that emerge from these studies
are that, ceteris paribus, bicameralism decreases government duration (Tsebelis 2000) and
increases the size of government coalitions (Lijphart 1984, Sjölin 1993). The ﬁrst conclusion
follows from the argument that when the agreement of two chambers is required to change
the status quo (that is, there are two “veto players”), the government is relatively more
unstable. The second conclusion follows from the argument that, in order to pass legislation
and hence implement policies, government coalitions need the support of a majority in both
chambers of parliament.2 In a recent empirical study of government formation and duration
2Lijphart’s (1984) argument, however, only applies to cases where the two chambers are elected by
diﬀerent constituencies. Italy, for example would be excluded because even though both Italian chambers
share all legislative and electoral powers, the representatives are elected from the same constituencies and
thus, according to Lijphart, are expected to represent the same interests. Germany, on the other hand, would
5in West European bicameral parliamentary democracies, Druckman and Thies (2002) ﬁnd
that governments that control a majority of seats in both chambers last substantially longer
than those who lack majority status in one of the chambers, but they ﬁnd little evidence
that governments add parties that generate “oversized” coalitions in the lower chamber in
order to ensure a majority in the upper chamber.3
As described above we can use the estimated structural model to conduct (counterfactual)
constitutional experiments. In our application we are interested in the consequences of
removing dual responsibility. Speciﬁcally, we estimate our structural model using data on
Belgian governments over the period 1945-1995. We then use the estimated model to assess
the consequences of the Belgian constitutional reform that eliminated dual responsibility
in 1995 and provide an equilibrium interpretation of our ﬁndings within the context of
our bargaining model. We also compare the results of our counterfactual experiment with
the results of the constitutional reform conducted in Sweden. Since Sweden eliminated
dual responsibility (and in fact eliminated its upper chamber altogether) in 1970, a simple
comparison of the data before and after the constitutional reform can provide some external
validity on the importance of the equilibrium eﬀects identiﬁed by our analysis.4
The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, our analysis predicts
that abolishing dual responsibility would have virtually no eﬀect on the average duration of
governments, while at the same time producing a sizeable impact on their composition. Ac-
cording to our analysis, eliminating government responsibility to the upper chamber would
qualify because even though the veto-powers of Germany’s upper house are limited, it represents state rather
than federal or district-speciﬁc constituencies.
3Note that Druckman and Thies (2002) do not estimate the eﬀect of bicameralism (i.e. the constitutional
feature per se) on government formation and duration. Rather, they are mainly interested in assessing how
majority status in the upper chamber of a bicameral parliament aﬀects government duration.
4Note that we cannot follow the same procedure for Belgium since there are not enough observations
following the 1995 reform.
6signiﬁcantly reduce the occurrence of surplus governments and increase the occurrence of mi-
nority governments. Second, the eﬀects predicted by the model line up with the observations
following the 1970 Swedish constitutional reform, where the average duration of governments
remained essentially unchanged but the fraction of minority governments doubled.
Thus, our ﬁndings demonstrate that the intuition that the prima facie plausible belief
that dual responsibility leads to less stable governments is unfounded. The key oversight is
that both the type (i.e., minority, minimum winning, or surplus) of the government coalition
as well as government duration are determined in equilibrium. The following two equilibrium
eﬀects play a key role to provide an intuition for our ﬁndings. First, there is a trade-oﬀ
between the size of a coalition and the share of the surplus each coalition member receives.
This trade-oﬀ determines the equilibrium choice of a coalition and government duration
given the composition of parliament in the presence of dual responsibility. Second, there is
an equilibrium replacement eﬀect, such that in equilibrium smaller coalitions “replace” larger
coalitions. If dual responsibility is removed, the terms of the trade-oﬀ change in a way that
makes minority coalitions relatively more attractive while leaving government duration the
same. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium response of strategic parties to changes
in their constitutional environment, our approach also allows us to quantify the eﬀects of
dual responsibility on the composition of government coalitions and government duration.
2M o d e l
We consider a bargaining model of government formation in a bicameral parliamentary
democracy with dual responsibility which generalizes the theoretical framework developed
in Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003). Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of parties rep-







denote the vector of the parties’ relative shares in parliamentary chamber C ∈ {H,S},w h e r e
H denotes the “House” (lower chamber) and S denotes the “Senate” (upper chamber).5
5The shares are determined by the outcome of a general election which is not modeled here.
7Each party i ∈ N has linear von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over the beneﬁts
from holding oﬃce xi ∈ I R+ and the composition of the government coalition G ⊆ N,
Ui(xi,G)=xi + u
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i ∈ I R.T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation captures the intuition that parties care both
about the beneﬁts from being in the government coalition and the identity of their coalition
partners. In particular, εG
i c a nb et h o u g h to fa st h eu t i l i t yt h a tap a r t yi nt h eg o v e r n m e n t
coalition obtains from implementing government policies. The policies implemented by a
government depend on the coalition partners’ relative preferences over policy outcomes and
on the institutional mechanisms through which policies are determined. In this paper, we
summarize all policy related considerations in equation (2).6 The assumption that εG
i >η G
i
for all i ∈ N and for all G ⊆ N, implies that, ceteris paribus, parties always prefer to be
included in the government coalition rather than being excluded. We let β ∈ (0,1) denote
the common discount factor reﬂecting the parties’ degree of impatience.
Our analysis begins after an election or the resignation of an incumbent government
(possibly because of a general election or because of a no-conﬁdence vote in the parliament).
We let T denote the time horizon to the next scheduled election (which represents the
maximum amount of time a new government could remain in oﬃce) and s ∈ Σ denote the
current state of the world (which summarizes the current political and economic situation).
While T is constant, we assume that the state of the world evolves over time according to
an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic process σ with state space Σ
and probability distribution function Fσ(·).
6For a richer, spatial model of government formation where government policies are endogenously deter-
mined, see Diermeier and Merlo (2000).
8After the resignation of an incumbent government, the head of state chooses one of the
parties represented in the parliament to try to form a new government. We refer to the
selected party k ∈ N as the formateur. Following Laver and Shepsle (1996) and Baron
(1993), we assume that the choice of a formateur is non-partisan and the head of state is
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0 if ∃ j 6= i : πC
j > 0.5,f o rC = H or C = S
,
(3)
where k−1 ∈ N denotes the party of the former prime minister, and Ii is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if k−1 = i and zero otherwise. This speciﬁcation captures the intuition
that although relatively larger parties may be more likely to be selected as a formateur than
relatively smaller parties, there may be an incumbency bias. It also reﬂects the fact that
if a party has an absolute majority in either chamber of the parliament (where an absolute
majority in the Senate is relevant because of dual responsibility), then it has to be selected
as the formateur.8
The formateur then chooses a proto-coalition D ∈ ∆k,w h e r e∆k denotes the set of subsets
of N which contain k.9 Intuitively, a proto-coalition is a set of parties that agree to talk







the size of proto-coalition D. The proto-coalition bargains over the formation of a new
government, which determines the allocation of government portfolios among the coalition
7Note that most constitutions are silent with respect to the rules for selecting a formateur, which are
generally reﬂected in unwritten conventions and norms.
8There are no cases in the data where diﬀerent parties have absolute majorities in diﬀerent chambers.
9Our assumption that parties always prefer to be included in the government coalition immediately implies
that the formateur party will never propose a proto-coalition that does not include itself.
9members, xD =( xD
i )i∈D ∈ R
|D|
+ . Following Merlo (1997), we assume that cabinet portfolios
generate a (perfectly divisible) unit level of surplus in every period a government is in power
and we let TD ∈ [0,T] denote the duration of a government formed by proto-coalition D.
Government duration in parliamentary democracies is not ﬁxed. Rather, it depends on
institutional factors (which include whether the government has dual responsibility), the
r e l a t i v es i z eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n tc o a l i t i o n ,t h et i m eh o r i z o nt ot h en e x te l e c t i o n ,t h es t a t e
of the political and economic system at the time a government forms, and political and
economic events occurring while a government is in power (see, e.g., King et al. 1990, Merlo
1998, and Warwick 1994). Let Q denote the vector of institutional characteristics (possibly)
aﬀecting government duration. Hence, TD can be represented as a random variable with
density function f(tD|s,T,Q,πD) over the support [0,T].10






denote the cake to be divided among the members of the proto-coalition D if they agree to
form a government in that state. That is, yD(·) ∈ (0,T) represents the total expected oﬃce


















denote the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors to be allocated in that state, where xD
i is the amount
of cake awarded by coalition D to party i ∈ D.
The proto-coalition bargaining game proceeds as follows. Given state s, the formateur
chooses either to pass or to propose an allocation xD ∈ XD(s,T,Q,πD).I f k proposes an
allocation, all the other parties in the proto-coalition sequentially respond by either accepting
or rejecting the proposal until either some party has rejected the oﬀer or all parties in D have
10Here, we treat government dissolution as exogenous. For a theoretical model where the decision of
dissolving a government is endogenous, see Diermeier and Merlo (2000).
10accepted it. If the proposal is unanimously accepted by the parties in the proto-coalition, a
government is inaugurated and the game ends. If no proposal is oﬀered and accepted by all
parties in the proto-coalition, state s0 is realized according to the stochastic process σ and
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, (6)
Let   ∈ D denote the identity of the proposer. The bargaining process continues until some
proposed allocation is unanimously accepted by the parties in the proto-coalition.
An outcome of this bargaining game (τD,χ D) may be deﬁned as a stopping time τD =
0,1,... and a |D|—dimensional random vector χD which satisﬁes χD ∈ XD(στD,T,Q,πD) if
τD < +∞ and χD =0otherwise. Given a realization of σ, τD denotes the period in which
a proposal is accepted by proto-coalition D,a n dχD denotes the proposed allocation that is
a c c e p t e di ns t a t eστD.D e ﬁne β
∞ =0 .T h e na no u t c o m e(τD,χ D) implies a von Neumann-




i ,a n dap a y o ﬀ to each party
j ∈ N\D equal to ηD
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For any formateur k ∈ N, each potential proto-coalition D ∈ ∆k is associated with an
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Let Dk ∈ ∆k denote the solution to this maximization problem.
2.1 Equilibrium Characterization
11The characterization of the equilibrium of this model relies on the general results for stochas-
tic bargaining games contained in Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998). In particular, the unique
stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this game has the following features. First, the
equilibrium agreement rule possesses a reservation property:i n a n y s t a t e s,c o a l i t i o nD
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Hence, delays can occur in equilibrium. During proto-coalition bargaining, the reservation
property implies a trade-oﬀ between delay in the formation process and expected duration.
Intuitively, coalitions may want to wait for a favorable state of the world that is associated
with a longer expected government duration and hence a larger cake. On the other hand, the
presence of discounting makes delay costly. In equilibrium, agreement is reached when these
opposite incentives are balanced. Notice that the role of delays is to “screen out” relatively
unstable governments. How much screening occurs in equilibrium depends on how impatient
parties are (measured by β), their institutional environment (summarized by Q), the length
of the time horizon to the next scheduled election (given by T), the size and composition of
the proto-coalition (equal to πD and D, respectively), and the uncertainty about the future
(summarized by the stochastic process σ).
Second, the equilibrium of the bargaining game satisﬁes the separation principle (Merlo
and Wilson (1998)): any equilibrium payoﬀ vector must be Pareto eﬃcient, and the set
of states where parties agree must be independent of the proposer’s identity. This implies
that in the proto-coalition bargaining stage, distribution and eﬃciency considerations are
independent and delays are optimal from the point of view of the parties in the proto-
coalition. In particular, perpetual disagreement is never an equilibrium, and for any possible
proto-coalition, agreement is reached within a ﬁnite amount of time. Hence, for any D ∈ ∆k,
if D is chosen as the proto-coalition, then D forms the government.
Third, for any formateur k ∈ N and for any potential proto-coalition D ∈ ∆k,t h ee x - a n t e
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Hence, we obtain that for any formateur k ∈ N, the equilibrium proto-coalition choice
Dk ∈ ∆k is given by
Dk =a r gm a x
D∈∆k
µ







k ,( 1 2 )
and Dk forms the government (that is, G = Dk).
When choosing a government coalition, a formateur faces a trade-oﬀ between “control”
(i.e., its own share of the cake) and “durability” (i.e., the overall size of the cake). That
is, on the one hand, relatively larger coalitions may be associated with longer expected du-
rations and hence relatively larger cakes. On the other hand, because of proto-coalition
bargaining, by including additional parties in its coalition the formateur party would receive
a smaller share of the cake. The equilibrium coalition choice depends on the terms of this
trade-oﬀ, which in turn, given the institutional environment Q, depend on the relative desir-
ability of the diﬀerent options y∗(·), the degree of impatience of the formateur β, its relative
“bargaining power” e pk(·), and the formateur’s tastes for its coalition partners εD
k .
To further explore the intuition of the model and illustrate some of the properties of the
equilibrium, we present a simple example. Suppose there are three parties, N = {1,2,3}
with πH =( 1 /5,1/5,3/5) and πS =( 1 /5,3/5,1/5), and party 1 is the formateur. For each
possible proto-coalition D ∈ ∆1 = {{1},{1,2},{1,3},{1,2,3}}, if agreement is not reached
on the formateur’s proposal, the probability that party 1 is selected to make the next proposal








1 =0 . Note that coalition
{1} has minority status in both chambers, coalitions {1,2} and {1,3} have minority status
in one chamber but are minimum winning majority coalitions in the other chamber, and
coalition {1,2,3} is a surplus majority coalition in both chambers.
The time horizon to the next election is ﬁve periods, T =5 . There are two possible
states of the world, Σ = {b,g}. Each state is realized with equal probability, Pr(σ =
13b)=P r ( σ = g)=1 /2. Consider an institutional environment with dual responsibility and
s u p p o s et h a ti fs = b, then governments that have minority status in both chambers are
expected to last one period, governments that have minority status in one chamber but
majority status in the other chamber are expected to last two periods, and governments
that have majority status in both chambers are expected to last three periods: that is,
y{1}(b)=1and y{1,2}(b)=y{1,3}(b)=2and y{1,2,3}(b)=3 . If, on the other hand, s = g,
then each government’s expected duration is increased by one period: that is, y{1}(g)=2 ,
y{1,2}(g)=y{1,3}(g)=3 ,a n dy{1,2,3}(g)=4 .T h i s s p e c i ﬁcation is intended to capture an
environment where both a government’s majority status and the state of the world aﬀect
the expected stability of coalition governments.
We begin by analyzing the outcome of proto-coalition bargaining for every possible proto-
coalition D ∈ ∆1.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the case where D = {1}. Using equation (10) above, it
is easy to verify that if β ≤ 2/3,t h e ny∗({1})=3 β/2 ≤ y{1}(b), which implies that delays
never occur. If, on the other hand, β>2/3,t h e ny∗({1})=2 β/(2 − β) >y {1}(b),w h i c h
implies that delays occur when s = b. Hence, using equation (11) above, the equilibrium












Next, consider the cases where D = {1,2} or D = {1,3}.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti fβ ≤ 4/5,
then y∗({1,2})=y∗({1,3})=5 β/2 ≤ y{1,2}(b)=y{1,3}(b), which implies that agreement
occurs in both states of the world. If, on the other hand, β>4/5,t h e ny∗({1,2})=
y∗({1,3})=3 β/(2 − β) >y {1,2}(b)=y{1,3}(b), which implies that agreement only occurs

























Finally, consider the case where D = {1,2,3}.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti fβ ≤ 6/7,t h e n
y∗({1,2,3})=7 β/2 ≤ y{1,2,3}(b), which implies that agreement occurs in both states of the
world. If, on the other hand, β>6/7,t h e ny∗({1,2,3})=4 β/(2 − β) >y {1,2,3}(b),w h i c h
implies that agreement only occurs when s = g. Hence, the equilibrium payoﬀ to party 1












The equilibrium payoﬀs to the formateur party 1 associated with all possible proto-coalitions
are depicted in Figure 1 as functions of the parameter β.
Hence, the equilibrium proto-coalition choice of the formateur party 1 is given by11
D1 =

    
    
{1,2,3} if β ∈ (0,0.46)
{1,2} if β ∈ (0.46,0.74)
{1} if β ∈ (0.74,1)
.
Ar e l a t i v e l yh i g hd e g r e eo fi m p a t i e n c ew o u l di n d u c et h ef o r m a t e u rt oc h o o s eas u r p l u sc o a l i -
tion that would immediately agree to form the government.12 On average, surplus govern-
ments would therefore be observed to last 3.5 periods. For intermediate levels of impatience,
on the other hand, the formateur would choose a coalition that has minority status in one
chamber but is a minimum winning majority coalition in the other chamber. Even in this
case, however, the process of government formation would involve no delay and would pro-
duce governments that would last, on average, 2.5 periods.13 Finally, for suﬃciently low
11Since ties are zero probability events, we are ignoring here the event of a tie between two alternatives.
12Notice that when D = {1,2,3} and β ∈ (0,0.46) agreement occurs in both states of the world.
13Notice that {1,3} is never chosen in equilibrium because its expected duration conditional on the state
of the world is identical to the one of {1,2}, but party 1’s preferences induce it to prefer {1,2}.
15degrees of impatience, the formateur would choose a coalition that has minority status in
both chambers. This government would continue negotiating until the “good” state of the
world is realized. Thus, it would last, on average, 2 periods.
The example illustrates the two equilibrium selection eﬀects captured by our model. First,
when β>2/3, the least durable minority governments (that is, minority governments that
come to power in a “bad” state of the world) are “screened out” in equilibrium and would
never form. This is a consequence of eﬃcient proto-coalition bargaining. Second, when
β ∈ (0.46,0.74), although a more durable option is always available (that is, a coalition
with majority status in both chambers), the formateur chooses a proto-coalition with a
smaller expected duration (and no majority status in one of the two chambers) because that
increases its share of oﬃce beneﬁts. This is an example of the fundamental trade-oﬀ described
above between “durability” (i.e., larger coalitions are typically more durable and hence are
associated with larger cakes) and “control” (i.e., larger coalitions imply smaller shares of
the cake for each coalition member) which drives the equilibrium selection of government
coalitions subject to institutional constraints. Of course, both eﬀects may work in consort.
When β is relatively high (i.e., β ∈ (0.74,1)), because short-lived minority governments are
screened out in equilibrium, a minority proto-coalition becomes relatively more attractive
compared to proto-coalitions with (at least partial) majority status.
To understand the role played by dual responsibility on the equilibrium selection of gov-
ernment coalitions, consider now a diﬀerent institutional environment without dual responsi-
bility such that y{1}(b)=y{1,2}(b)=2 , y{1,3}(b)=y{1,2,3}(b)=3 , y{1}(g)=y{1,2}(g)=3 ,a n d
y{1,3}(g)=y{1,2,3}(g)=4 , while holding everything else constant. Since the seat shares in
the Senate are no longer relevant to determine the majority status of government coalitions,
coalitions {1} and {1,2} are now both minority coalitions, while coalitions {1,3} and {1,2,3}
are both majority coalitions. Relative to the previous case, it is now “as if” all coalitions have
majority status in the Senate. Hence, for example, {1,2,3} now simply corresponds to a
16surplus majority coalition. As in the case of dual responsibility, this speciﬁcation is intended
to capture an environment that is consistent with some basic empirical regularities about
coalition duration. For example, surplus majority coalitions do not necessarily last longer
than minimal winning coalitions. Also, without dual responsibility the expected duration of
each possible coalition is likely to be longer.14
As above, we begin by analyzing the outcome of proto-coalition bargaining for every
possible proto-coalition D ∈ ∆1.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the case where D = {1} or D = {1,2}.I ti s
easy to verify that if β ≤ 4/5,t h e ny∗({1})=y∗({1,2})=5 β/2 ≤ y{1}(b)=y{1,2}(b),w h i c h
implies that delays never occur. If, on the other hand, β>4/5,t h e ny∗({1})=y∗({1,2})=
3β/(2 − β) >y {1}(b)=y{1,2}(b), which implies that delays occur when s = b.H e n c e , t h e
























Next, consider the cases where D = {1,3} or D = {1,2,3}. I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti f
β ≤ 6/7,t h e ny∗({1,3})=y∗({1,2,3})=7 β/2 ≤ y{1,3}(b)=y{1,2,3}(b), which implies
that agreement occurs in both states of the world. If, on the other hand, β>6/7,t h e n
y∗({1,3})=y∗({1,2,3})=4 β/(2−β) >y {1,3}(b)=y{1,2,3}(b), which implies that agreement
only occurs when s = g. Hence, the equilibrium payoﬀ to party 1 from choosing proto-











14See, e.g., Tsebelis (2000).












The equilibrium payoﬀs to the formateur party 1 associated with all possible proto-coalitions
are depicted in Figure 2 as functions of the parameter β.






{1,3} if β ∈ (0,0.29)
{1} if β ∈ (0.29,1)
.
Notice that in this case, the surplus coalition {1,2,3} is never an equilibrium proto-coalition
choice of the formateur party 1 for any value of β. This follows from the fact that without
dual responsibility, adding party 2 to the coalition does not increase expected duration, but
(because of proto-coalition bargaining) it decreases the formateur’s share of oﬃce beneﬁts.
Hence, {1,2,3} is dominated by {1,3}. For a similar reason {1,2} is never selected, since
in the absence of dual responsibility both {1,2} and {1} are minority coalitions. Note also,
that the range of values of β where the minority option {1} is chosen in equilibrium is larger.
Hence, in this example, removing dual responsibility signiﬁcantly reduces the occurrence of
surplus governments and increases the occurrence of minority governments.
Turning our attention to government duration, note that in the case where β<0.29,
where a majority government is optimal, there is no proto-coalition “screening.” That is,
{1,3} w o u l db eo b s e r v e dt ol a s t3.5 periods on average. For β>0.8, minority governments
are optimal with proto-coalition screening, resulting in an average duration of 3 periods.
For β ∈ (0.29,0.8), minority governments are also optimal, but it is not worthwhile for
the formateur to delay government formation, thus resulting in an average duration of 2.5
periods. The eﬀect of dual responsibility on government duration is illustrated in Figure 3.
Depending on the parameters of the model, eliminating dual responsibility can either have no
18eﬀect on government duration (e.g., for β<0.29), it can increase government duration (e.g.,
for β>0.46) ,o ri tc a ne v e nd e c r e a s eg o v e r n m e n td u r a t i o n( e . g . ,f o rβ ∈ (0.29,0.46)). This
last possibility illustrates the potentially powerful consequences of accounting for equilibrium
responses by strategic parties. If β ∈ (0.29,0.46),t h ef o r m a t e u rp a r t y1 would choose to be
in a minority government rather than in the surplus coalition {1,2,3} if dual responsibility
was abandoned.
The example illustrates the equilibrium replacement eﬀect captured by our model. Above,
we described the model’s fundamental trade-oﬀ between durability (i.e., larger coalitions are
typically more durable and hence are associated with larger cakes) and control (i.e., larger
coalitions imply smaller shares of the cake for each coalition member) which drives the
equilibrium selection of government coalitions subject to the institutional constraints. The
terms of this trade-oﬀ depend crucially on the relative durability of the diﬀerent options
which, in turn, depends on the institutional environment where government formation takes
place. Changes in the institutional environment brought about by constitutional reforms,
induce changes in the terms of the trade-oﬀ which trigger an equilibrium response in the
selection of the type of government coalitions that form and their relative stability. When the
government is responsible both to the House and the Senate, a vote of no-conﬁdence in either
chamber of parliament is suﬃcient to terminate the government. The equilibrium response
to this institutional constraint is to form larger (surplus) coalitions (possibly constituting a
majority in both chambers), to achieve the desired level of durability at the cost of a loss of
control on the part of the formateur. Removing dual responsibility, while holding everything
else the same, removes one source of instability and makes it possible to achieve similar levels
of durability by “replacing” larger coalitions with smaller coalitions.
As evidenced in this example, our model is capable of addressing the issues discussed in
the introduction. However, it should also be clear from the example that the predictions
of the model critically depend on the values of the model’s parameters. In order to assess
19quantitatively the eﬀects that removing dual responsibility would have on the formation and
dissolution of coalition governments, we need to estimate our structural model.
3 Data and Estimation
Our sample consists of 34 governments in Belgium over the period 1945—1995. An observation
in the sample is deﬁned by the identity of the formateur party, k, the composition of the
proto-coalition, Dk, the duration of the negotiation over the formation of a new government
(i.e., the number of attempts), τDk, the sequence of proposers (one for each attempt) if
the formateur does not succeed to form the government at the ﬁrst attempt,  2,..., τDk,
and the duration of the government following that negotiation (i.e., the number of days the
government remains in power), tDk. For each element in the sample we also observe the time
horizon to the next scheduled election, T, the set of parties represented in the parliament,
N, the vector of their relative seat shares, πH and πS,a n dt h ep a r t yo ft h ef o r m e rp r i m e
minister, k−1.
Keesings Record of World Events (1944—present) was used to collect information on the
number of attempts for each government formation, the identity of the proposer on each
attempt, the time horizon to the next election, and the duration of the government follow-
ing each negotiation. The list of parties represented in the parliament and their shares of
parliamentary seats at the time of each negotiation over the formation of a new government
was taken from Mackie and Rose (1990) and, for later years in the sample, from Keesings,
the European Journal of Political Research,a n dt h eLijphart Elections Archives.
Descriptive statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1, where MINORITY is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the government coalition is a minority coalition
in the House (i.e., it controls less than 50% of the parliamentary seats) and zero otherwise;
MAJORITY is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the government coalition is a
majority coalition in the House (i.e., it controls at least 50% of the parliamentary seats) and
zero otherwise; MINWIN is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the government
20coalition is a minimum winning majority coalition in the House (i.e., removing any of the
parties from the coalition would always result in a minority coalition); SURPLUS is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the government coalition is a surplus majority
coalition in the House (i.e., it is possible to remove at least one party from the coalition
without resulting in a minority coalition) and zero otherwise; and MAJSENATE is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the government coalition is a majority coalition
in the Senate and zero otherwise.
In the bargaining model described in Section 2, we speciﬁed the cake a generic proto-
coalition D bargains over in any given period, yD, to be equal to the expected government
duration conditional on the state of the world in that period, s, given the vector of (time-
invariant) characteristics, (T,Q,πD). Also, we characterized the conditions under which
agreement occurs in terms of a reservation rule on the size of the current cake. Hence, from
the perspective of the political parties that observe the cakes, the sequence of events in a
negotiation is deterministic, since they agree to form a government as soon as the current
cake is above a threshold that depends only on their expectation about future states of the
world and hence future cakes. The only uncertainty concerns the actual duration of the
government after it is formed: TD. The sources for this uncertainty are political events
(such as a scandal) occurring while the government is in power. Thus, TD is modeled as a
random variable.
We (the econometricians), however, do not observe the state of the world s.15 Hence,
from the perspective of the econometrician, the cake yD(s,T,Q,πD) ≡ E[TD|s,T,Q,πD] is
also a random variable.16 Let Fy(yD|T,Q,πD) denote the conditional distribution of cakes
15In particular, we do not observe all the relevant elements in the parties’ information set when they form
their expectations about government durations. Thus, we do not observe the cake.
16Since, by assumption, s is i.i.d., yD is also i.i.d.. The assumption that the state of the world follows an
i.i.d. stochastic process is critical to obtain the simple equilibrium characterization described in Section 2
above, which makes the estimation of the model feasible.
21with conditional density fy(·|·) deﬁned over the support [0,y],a n dl e tFT(tD|yD;T,Q,πD)
denote the conditional distribution of government durations with conditional density fT(·|·)
deﬁned over the support [0,T],w h e r ey<T is the upper bound on the expectations over
government duration and FT(·|·) satisﬁes the restriction E[TD|yD;T,Q,πD]=yD.17 Thus,
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This is the probability that the ﬁrst τ−1 cakes are smaller than the threshold y∗(D,T,Q,πD)
and the cake in period τ i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oy∗(D,T,Q,πD). Moreover, the probability
of a government duration t following an agreement after τ r o u n d so fn e g o t i a t i o n si se q u a lt o








.( 1 5 )
Agreement implies that the expected government duration is above the threshold y∗(D,T,Q,
πD). However, we (the econometricians) do not know exactly which cake led to the agree-
ment. Hence, in order to compute this probability, we have to average over all the possible
cakes that may have induced the agreement.
Let us now consider the decision problem faced by the formateur party k.F o r e a c h
possible coalition D ∈ ∆k,p a r t yk can compute its expected equilibrium payoﬀ if D is
17Note that Fy(yD|T,Q,πD) and FT(tD|yD;T,Q,πD) imply a distribution of TD conditional on
(T,Q,πD).
22chosen as the proto-coalition and bargains over the formation of a new government. The
formateur’s expected payoﬀ i sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 1 1 )a n dd e p e n d so nt h ee x p e c t e do u t c o m eo f
the bargaining process as well as the formateur’s tastes for its coalition partners, εD
k .H e n c e ,
from the perspective of the formateur party that knows its tastes, the optimal coalition
choice described in equation (12) is deterministic. We (the econometricians), however, do
not observe the formateur’s tastes for its coalition partners, εD
k . Hence, as above, from the
perspective of the econometrician, εD
k is a random variable. This implies that the expected
payoﬀ Wk(D,T,Q,πD) is also a random variable, which in turn implies that the formateur’s
decision problem is probabilistic. Following McFadden (1973), Rust (1987) and many others,
we assume that εD
k , D ∈ ∆k, are independently and identically distributed according to a
type I extreme value distribution with standard deviation ρ.18 Thus, from the point of view
of the econometrician, the probability that the formateur party k chooses a particular proto-
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We can now derive the likelihood function which represents the basis for the estimation
of our structural model. The contribution to the likelihood function of each observation
in the sample is equal to the probability of observing the vector of (endogenous) events
(k,D k,τDk,  2,..., τDk,t Dk) conditional on the vector of (exogenous) characteristics Z =
(T,Q,N,π,k−1), given the vector of the model’s parameters θ =( α0,α 1,α 2,β,ρ,F y,F T).
Given the structure of our model and our equilibrium characterization, this probability can
18For a detailed description of the properties of this family of distributions see, e.g., Johnson and Kotz
(1970; vol. 1, pp. 272-295).
23be written as
Pr(k,D k,τ
Dk,  2,...,  τDk,t


















































The log-likelihood function is obtained by summing the logs of (17) over all the elements in
the sample.19
The next step consists of choosing ﬂexible parametric functional forms for Fy(·|·) and
FT(·|·). We assume that Fy(·|·) and FT(·|·) belong to the family of beta distributions.20 In
19Note that computing the likelihood function is a rather burdensome task since one has to enumerate all
possible proto-coalitions and solve all possible bargaining games a formateur may choose to play.
20The family of beta distributions is the most ﬂexible family of parametric distributions for continuous
random variables with a ﬁnite support (see, e.g., Johnson and Kotz 1970; vol. 1, pp. 37-56). Some amount of
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yD ∈ [0,y(T,Q)],w h e r e
γ(T,Q,π


































tD ∈ [0,T],w h e r eB(·,·) denotes the beta function and
δ(T,Q,π
D)=e x p ( δ0 + δ1T).( 2 2 )














Several comments are in order. First, our parameterization of fy(·|·) and fT(·|·) are highly
ﬂexible, and allow us to capture the (potential) eﬀects of the institutional environment on
the (expected and actual) duration of governments of diﬀerent types in a fairly unrestricted
25way.21 For example, government coalitions of diﬀerent sizes may diﬀer in their ability to
cope with events even when exposed to similar shocks. Speciﬁcally, minority governments
may be expected to last less than majority governments. Second, the speciﬁcation described
in equations (18)-(22) above also allows for the possibility that government coalitions of the
same size may face diﬀerent survival prospects depending on the remaining time horizon T.
4R e s u l t s
Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model, (α, β,
γ, δ, λ, ρ), where α =( α0,α 1,α 2), γ =( γ0,...,γ7),a n dδ =( δ0,δ1). To assess the ﬁto ft h e
model we present Tables 3 to 7. In each of these tables, we focus on a diﬀerent dimension
of the data and we compare the predictions of the model to the empirical distribution. For
each dimension of the data, one of the criteria we use to assess how well the model ﬁts the









where f(·) denotes the empirical density function, or histogram, of a given (endogenous) vari-
able, b f(·) denotes the maximum likelihood estimate of the density function of that variable,
q is the number of observations, and K is the number of bins of the histogram.
The results from table 3-7 show that the model performs remarkably well in reproducing
all aggregate features of the data. Moreover, the χ2 goodness-of-ﬁt test never rejects the
model at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The ability of the model to ﬁtt h ed a t ai sa n
important step toward building conﬁdence in the quantitative implications of the model.
4.1 Constitutional Experiments
We use our estimated model to evaluate the following counterfactual constitutional exper-
iment. Suppose in 1945 Belgium had eliminated government responsibility to the upper
21Notice that, by deﬁnition of beta distributions, γ(·) and δ(·) must be strictly positive. This justiﬁes
the exponential functions in (19) and (21). Also, to economize on the number of parameters, we restricted
Fy(·|·) to be a power-function distribution (i.e., a beta distribution with one parameter normalized to one).
26chamber from its constitution. What would have been the eﬀects on the composition and
durability of Belgian governments according to our model? To answer this question we use
the results of past elections and the estimated model to predict the outcomes of the gov-
ernment formation process in the absence of dual responsibility. In particular, we replace
πS =( 0 ,...,0) for all elections and we set MAJSENATE =1for all possible coalitions.
The results of our experiment are documented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8. Here,
column 1 summarizes the data relative to Belgian governments, column 2 reports the model’s
predictions based on the actual Belgian constitution (which, until 1995, prescribed the dual
responsibility of the government), and column 3 contains the results of the constitutional
experiment predicted by our model. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from Table 8. The
model predicts that abolishing dual responsibility would have had virtually no eﬀect on the
a v e r a g ed u r a t i o no fB e l g i a ng o v e r n m e n t s ,w h i l ea tt h es a m et i m ep r o d u c i n gas i z e a b l ei m p a c t
on their composition. According to our analysis, eliminating government responsibility to
the Senate would signiﬁcantly reduce the occurrence of surplus governments (from 22% to
6%) and increase the occurrence of minority governments (from 13% to 86%).
To provide an external point of comparison we consider the outcomes of a similar consti-
tutional reform implemented in Sweden in 1970. The results of this reform are reported in
Table 9. In this table, column 1 summarizes the data relative to the 12 Swedish governments
prior to the 1970 reform, while column 2 summarizes the data relative to the 14 Swedish
governments after the reform. As we can see from this table, the results of the constitutional
reform are similar to the ones predicted by our model for Belgium. In particular, while gov-
ernment duration remained virtually unchanged, the fraction of minority governments more
than doubled (from 42% to 86%). Note that Sweden never experienced surplus governments
(either before or after the reform).22
22As explained in Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003), the lack of surplus governments in Sweden (but
also in Denmark and Norway) is due to a constitutional feature known as negative parliamentarism.T h i s
feature is not present in the Belgian constitution.
27Our theoretical model provides an equilibrium interpretation of these results. At the
heart of our bargaining model there is a fundamental trade-oﬀ between “durability” (i.e.,
larger coalitions are typically more durable and hence are associated with larger cakes) and
“control” (i.e., larger coalitions imply smaller shares of the cake for each coalition member)
which drives the equilibrium selection of government coalitions subject to the institutional
constraints. The terms of this trade-oﬀ depend crucially on the relative durability of the
diﬀerent options which, in turn, depends on the institutional environment where government
formation takes place. Changes in the institutional environment brought about by consti-
tutional reforms, induce changes in the terms of the trade-oﬀ which trigger an equilibrium
response in the selection of the type of government coalitions that form and their relative
stability. When the government is responsible both to the House and the Senate, a vote
of no-conﬁdence in either chamber of parliament is suﬃcient to terminate the government.
The equilibrium response to this institutional constraint is to form larger (surplus) coalitions
(possibly constituting a majority in both chambers), to achieve the desired level of durabil-
ity at the cost of a loss of control. Removing dual responsibility, while holding everything
else the same, removes one source of instability and by making each coalition more durable,
it allows the formateur to achieve higher payoﬀs by forming smaller coalitions (equilibrium
replacement eﬀect). Since smaller coalitions are relatively less durable than larger coalitions,
however, the replacement eﬀect compensates the duration-enhancing eﬀect of removing dual
responsibility, thus leading to a negligible change in average government duration. The
magnitude of these eﬀects depends on the magnitude of the model’s parameters.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we propose a structural approach to study the eﬀects of “dual responsibility”
on the composition and stability of coalition governments in the context of a bargaining
model of government formation in a bicameral parliamentary democracy. To quantify the
qualitative insights of our theoretical model, we estimate the model’s parameters using a
28data set that contains all Belgian coalition governments between 1945 and 1995, the year
Belgium abandoned dual responsibility in its constitution. These estimates are then used
to conduct a counterfactual experiment of constitutional design where we eliminate dual
responsibility. Our results indicate a strong selection eﬀect in the types of governments that
form. Without dual responsibility formateurs have a stronger incentive to propose minority
governments. Since minority governments are less durable than majority governments, the
longer expected coalition duration conditional on having formed in a system where dual
responsibility has been removed is oﬀset by the selection of shorter-lived coalition types.
Based on our estimates, the net eﬀect of removing dual responsibility on average government
duration is negligible.
Our ﬁndings cast some doubt on the validity of much of the existing empirical research
on government stability (e.g. King et al. 1990, Strom 1990, Warwick 1994) that rely on
coalition speciﬁc characteristics (such as the coalition’s majority status) or the political
context of government formation (e.g. the number of formation attempts) as exogenous
variables in a regression model. As shown in our analysis, the government’s majority status
(and, in general, which coalition forms the government), its formation time, and its expected
duration are all endogenous and are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. This suggests
that the traditional methodology used by existing studies is problematic and may lead to
incorrect inferences. We hope to explore the implications of these insights further in future
research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of attempts  2.41  1.50  1  7 
Government duration 
(days) 
494.85 475.66  7  1502 
Time to next election 
(days) 
1208.27 361.48  133  1515 
Number of parties  6.59  2.05  4  11 
Size of government 
coalition (% in House) 
61.91 12.27 34.20  84.90 
Size of government 
coalition (% in Senate) 
63.92 12.89 32.90  88.00 
MINORITY 0.12  0.33  0  1 
MINWIN 0.70  0.46  0  1 
SURPLUS 0.18  0.39  0  1 
MAJSENATE 0.97  0.17  0 1 
 
  33 
 
 
Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Parameter Estimate  Standard  error 
α0 9.768  3.753 
α1 2.217  0.575 
α2 1.865  0.476 
β 0.885  0.115 
γ0 -2.170  0.909 
γ1 -0.165  0.642 
γ2 -2.026  0.737 
γ3 0.143  0.388 
γ4 -3.913  1.350 
γ5   1.291  0.660 
γ6 0.044  0.339 
γ7 2.310  0.484 
δ0   2.526  1.015 
δ1 -4.095  1.584 
λ -0.002  0.619 
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Table 3: Density Functions of Formateur Size and Goodness-of-fit Test 
 
Interval Data  Model 
0-10%  0.000 0.017 
10%-20%  0.000 0.008 
20%-30%  0.147 0.149 
30%-40%  0.618 0.558 
40%-50%  0.147 0.181 
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Table 4: Density Functions of Negotiation Duration and Goodness-of-fit Test 
 
Attempt Data Model 
1  0.353 0.426 
2  0.265 0.238 
3  0.147 0.134 
4  0.147 0.077 
5  0.059 0.045 
6  0.000 0.027 
7  0.029 0.017 
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Table 5: Density Functions of Government Duration and Goodness-of-fit Test 
 
Interval Data  Model 
0-6 mo  0.353 0.335 
6 mo-1 yr  0.235 0.178 
1 yr-1.5 yr  0.059 0.121 
1.5 yr-2 yr  0.088 0.090 
2 yr-2.5 yr  0.059 0.073 
2.5 yr-3 yr  0.029 0.062 
3 yr-3.5 yr  0.088 0.058 













495 days  487 days 
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Table 6: Density Functions of Government Size and Goodness-of-fit Test 
 
Interval Data  Model 
0-10%  0.000 0.000 
10%-20%  0.000 0.000 
20%-30%  0.000 0.007 
30%-40%  0.029 0.039 
40%-50%  0.088 0.088 
50%-60%  0.382 0.473 
60%-70%  0.235 0.176 
70%-80%  0.147 0.096 
80%-90%  0.118 0.065 
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Table 7: Density Functions of Government Type and Goodness-of-fit Test 
 
Type Data  Model 
Minority 12%  13% 
Minimum winning  70%  65% 
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Table 8: Constitutional Experiment in Belgium 
 


































% Min. Win. 


















Table 9: Constitutional Change in Sweden 
 




Average Number  
of Attempts   1.3 1.1   
 
Average Government 
Duration (days)  764 719   
 
Average Government 
Size (% in the House)  52 43 
 
% Minority 
Governments  42 86 
 
% Min. Win. 
Governments  58 14 
 
% Surplus 
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